A Typical Apolitical

Nueces Democrats: Hegemony: Power, Culture & Ideology: Lencho Rendon: The Pimping Out Of The President & Hillary

2008-03-03T10:39:00.000-08:00

Nueces Democrats: Hegemony: Power, Culture & Ideology: Lencho Rendon: The Pimping Out Of The President & Hillary:

"It is a simple choice, vote for Joe or vote for the Solomonista."

A Velacrat seeks a Federal Bench for his Rose? Is he targeting the Congresional Hispanic Caucus? After all, he was the "S Tx money man"

2007-12-17T00:44:00.001-08:00

Is it Fil Vela who rolls out the welcome mat & @ WATT level do the ...
By Jaime Kenedeño(dannoynted1)
Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont give a hoot about a VA Hospital or Children's Healthcare. Fil Junior only seeks a Federal Bench for Rose. South Texas Chisme: Could it be true, Is Fil Vela involved with ...
Corpus Christi Caller Times - http://corpuschristicallertimes.blogspot.com/

Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont ...
By Jaime Kenedeño(Jaime Kenedeño)
Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont give a hoot about a VA Hospital or Children's Healthcare. Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont give a hoot about a VA Hospital or ...
South Texas Verdad - http://stxv.blogspot.com/

Texas Monthly Web Press: Fil & Junior John ( the Two Juniors) dont ...
By Jaime Kenedeño(Jaime Kenedeño)
who he will benefit and who he represents. No if ands or buts about it Junior John's Record is who he is, how he votes, who he represents and it is not the average Texan. Corpus Christi, Nueces County, Kenedeno, dannoynted1, ...
Corpus Christi Caller - http://cccaller.blogspot.com/

Telemundo South Texas: Is this Man fit to be caged?

2007-07-17T02:05:00.000-07:00

Telemundo South Texas: Is this Man fit to be caged?

Look in their EYES. What do you feel?

South Texas Verdad: By the way, the Anton Haley who's such a Watts cheerleader on DU is better known here as Jaime Kenedeno, noted Communist hunter an

2007-07-14T10:23:00.000-07:00

South Texas Verdad: Let us make a CHOICE to engage the passionate fire for liberty against a man who has already made the CHOICE to vote against your right of CHOICE as a Woman.

Telemundo South Texas: BOYCOTT TELEMUNDO Advertisers & Corporate Conglomerates who claim lip service to "COMMUNITY AFFAIRS".

2007-07-13T02:37:00.000-07:00

Telemundo South Texas: BOYCOTT TELEMUNDO Advertisers & Corporate Conglomerates who claim lip service to "COMMUNITY AFFAIRS".

Beware of the Progressive Bandwagon & at least you guys had a good template to follow. No need to say anything else right guys? This cause needs a target for a concentrated effect moving the steadfast who remain unrebuffed. We need the corporations and the companies that hire the raw labor to be able to benefit from the labor and process the worker class of mejicano as Corporate America strives and works in the lobby and underneath whispers to process the Asian Technology Class ala PING. I will direct you to center stage with Johnny Canales. "Take It Away",........ "Esso". Is that how you spell it.

Johnny,

Here is some energy for your BOYCOTT TELEMUNDO & Breach of Contract Litmus Test.

Press Release: National Call For Action Spreading Thru Internet Rapidly Inbox

					Reply to all Forward Print Add Goodson to Contacts list Report phishing Show original Message text garbled?
	from	"H. Goodson"	hide details	2:54 am (5 minutes ago)
to		Jaime Kenedeno , jmaccormack@express-news.net, lharter@newsguy.com, news@kiiitv.com, news@kztv10.com, news@recordstar.com, newsroom@kristv.com, g , acovarrubias@entravision.com, averytl@caller.com, garzaa@caller.com, kent.harrell@kztv10.com, ksullivan@kiiitv.com, metrodesk@caller.com, mramirez@entravision.com, noticias28@entravision.com, rgonzales@kristv.com
date		Jul 13, 2007 2:54 AM
subject		Press Release: National Call For Action Spreading Thru Internet Rapidly
signed-by		yahoo.com
mailed-by		yahoo.com

National Call For Action Spreading Thru Internet
Rapidly

E-mail has also crossed U.S. borders into other
countries around the world!

By H. Nelson Goodson
El Conquistador Newspaper
3206 W. National Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53215
U.S.A.
414-383-1000
conquistador@bizwi.rr.com
July 13, 2007

Milwaukee- An e-mail calling for national action and
the financial management of our economic purchasing
power by Latinos and immigrants to influence
immigration reform is circulating and spreading like
wild fire on the Internet. Even, conservative and
anti-immigrant groups have posted the e-mail on their
web sites. The LibertyPost.org posted on their web
page, “We won round 1. NEW Immigration fights are
gearing up. WATCH where you spend your money $$$ !!
DON'T relax. The fight is not over YET. Supporters of
Amnesty are already gearing up for the next round. We
cannot rest on our laurels until we pass legislation
that prevents any future Amnesty bill from ever
passing.”
http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=192851

The e-mail has also crossed the United States border
into other countries. The circulating e-mail reads,
last month’s decision by the U.S. Senate to block an
immigration bill has left Immigration reformist around
the country debating about what alternatives are left
and how to bring an immigration bill back to the
floor. The Senate’s decision to block any action in
approving a bill has for now sealed its fate. Will the
House now have enough support to revive the issue?
Probably not, and advocates for a just immigration
bill will now have to wait until after the 2008
Presidential elections.
Will the current Presidential candidates take up the
debate and promise to support and sign a comprehensive
immigration bill into law as President George W. Bush
has agreed to do so? We might have to wait for an
answer from the candidates.
Undocumented immigrants contribute more than 890
billion of dollars into our U.S. economy per year.
Millions of americans who support immigration reform,
including immigration advocacy groups, educators,
community based organizations, unions and members of
the entertainment industry as well as major Latino
owned businesses, food processors, financial
institutions, mortgage firms, corporations,
manufacturers, and the list continues, have and will
continue to contribute just as much into our economy.
Last year and including May 1, 2007, the immigrant
population, their families, friends and supporters for
immigration reform have marched in huge numbers
totaling millions throughout cities around the
country. Their ability to organize and vote resulted
in the unexpected control of both houses by Democrats.
Even President Bush surrounded by his cabinet with
frowning looks conceded defeat live on national news
networks.
Immigrants, advocacy groups and supporters have united
for a common cause throughout the nation. Their
efforts have yet to be taken seriously by those
opposing the legalization of the 12 million
undocumented immigrants already in the country.
What alternatives do immigrants have for now to get
the immigration issue resolve in the near future?
Immigration advocates could argue by looking at the
current situation that undocumented immigrants are
left with few options. But today, there is one
rewarding option which has not been fully utilized by
immigrants.
Immigrants need an effective strategy for financial
management of their economic purchasing power which
totals in the billions of dollars to influence
immigration reform. People from across the country
have suggested for financial management of our
expenditures and are waiting for the inevitable. The
national call for action is the inevitable.
Our success to bring about a just immigration reform
depends on every individual and persons willing to
adjust their spending practices. Today, we spend our
money just about anywhere and on anything without
realizing who actually ends up with our money. The
Senate’s decision to block immigration reform sends
the wrong message that undocumented immigrants from
Russia, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Mexico
and all over the world are not welcome in America,
especially when they help contribute to their state
and cities' economy and cultural wealth.
On September 17, we should begin to invest, shop and
spend our money in businesses and entities that
support immigration reform. We have a grace period
from now until September to begin adjusting our
expenditures by shopping in places that are willing to
post a sign in the window saying “We Support
Immigration Reform Now” and display a copy of a
certified letter sent to their Congress and U.S.
Senate Representative requesting support. If they
don’t know about it, feel free to advise them to post
one up as soon as they can.
Once we are able to manage our purchasing power as a
united effort throughout the nation, then we can
accomplish our quest to influence the passage of a
just immigration reform. Why has September 17 been
chosen as the target date to actually begin our full
strategic action throughout the nation. It’s the day
after the well celebrated 16 de septiembre la
Independencia de Mexico. On September 16, numerous
communities with largely Hispanic populations
throughout our nation recognize and celebrate the
Independence of Mexico, which has been commercialized
by this country. It’s a celebration where non
Hispanics also take time to go out and consume Mexican
products, eat tacos and enjoy Mariachi music.
Opponents of immigration reform claim that a large
portion of Hispanics in the country are undocumented.
In conjunction with September, Hispanic Heritage month
begins and will no doubt provide awareness of how
truly Hispanics and immigrants have contributed to our
nation. As a nation, we recognize the achievements and
contributions Latinos and non Latinos have done while
working along side each other for the welfare,
freedom, liberty, economic success, and especially for
those brave women and men who have given their lives
as the ultimate sacrifice to protect our country and
uphold the U.S. Constitution.

A Civil Action in the Making?

2007-07-02T01:12:00.000-07:00

Why must we flex our muscles?
Nueces County, CCISD, 105th Judicial District Attorney; how many kids were locked up without an attorney?

There is no excuse for violating the basic human rights afforded under the United States Constitution.
How many kids were locked up by a court of nonrecord?
Not even with a parent's consent unless the parent has been given the opportunity to consult with counsel.
How many children taken into custody were advised of their Miranda Rights?
Oh yeah, Plaisted and every CCISD kid for whom, he provided service

.

What do we want?

Go do some homework, we want responsive representation with transparent operation.

We want to not be railroaded for tardies or for absences when the District does not practice due diligence in interdicting but is very diligent in recording the events and adamantly prosecutes and collects half of the fine. When the people cant pay the kids are picked up from class and taken in handcuffs to the court of nonrecord. The Parent is contacted and ordered to appear immediately. When the Parent arrives he or she is told to pay or your kid goes to jail and sometimes the parent is threatened and / or locked up as well. I have never seen a kid who has been provided counsel but I have witnessed many a kid go to jail.

And this from non responsive legislators who have enabled the School Administration to blame the parent when they allow children in their custody to roam at large unaccounted for and the District in coordination with the Courts of non record get paid (profit) from it.

"Court Appointed Rolodex's". Nanotechnology and "Confessing Error" in a dog and pony show who operate like they are in a Kangaroo Court.

2007-07-01T08:58:00.000-07:00

Nanotechnology at work right before our eyes finally an acknowledgment of what has been going on for quite a while now. The information in those "Court Appointed Rolodex's", there is gold in them hills. And this is going to start becoming available when? and for who? We have came to a narrowing of the road here in this alligning of energy fields. I can see it now we got Mikal who who is the adversary of my adversary John Cornyn. We also have the Honorable Judge Manuel Banales who needs to align with Mr Watts and vice versa. Does he want run for mayor unopposed? I would rather see him correct the errors and run for Governor or Ascend to the Texas Supreme Court. Now, John Cornyn has "Confessed Error" and I assure you it wasn't out of fairness but in the essence of knocking the checkers off of the Table because he was going to lose. And Carlos Valdez & John Hubert "Confess Error" on appeal from the 105th. Hubert & Valdez "confess error" so they can conceal Mary Cano. And that is as painless as it gets.
Anton

CCCT Political Pulse
Mikal Watts seeks to round up list of Democrats for self, others
By Jaime Powell
A Monday noontime fundraiser at Vietnam restaurant for U.S. Senate hopeful Mikal Watts was a who's who of the local bar association and judiciary, including five district judges. Watts, who is living in San Antonio, told the crowd that "nobody knows Mikal Watts better than Corpus Christi."

Watts, a Democrat, who is seeking the seat held by Republican Sen. John Cornyn, asked the gathering to dig through their Rolodexes and e-mail address lists because he hopes to compile a statewide database to reach Democratic voters that can be used by all Texas Democrats.

"That way, when Judge (J. Manuel) Bañales runs for mayor he can use it," Watts joked, to uproarious laughter from the crowd and a big grin from Bañales, who was sitting on the front row.

If you need an attorney.....if he is any good he will tell you watt an "Ander's Appeal" is? If he tells you not to worry about it.........FIRE HIM !!!

2007-06-30T01:55:00.000-07:00

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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-75,176

Ex parte RICKIE LYNN CROW, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W01-59845-T IN THE 283rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Keller, P.J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

O P I N I O N

The question in this case is whether an applicant must show prejudice to establish entitlement to an out-of-time petition for discretionary review (PDR) due to counsel's failure to follow the requirements of Ex parte Wilson. (1) We hold that a limited showing of prejudice is required. Finding that applicant has made this limited showing, we grant relief.

I. BACKGROUND

Applicant was charged with the offense of aggravated robbery. He pled "not guilty" and was subsequently convicted. He appealed. Represented by counsel on appeal, applicant challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence and alleged Batson (2) error. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on April 4, 2003, but appellate counsel failed to inform applicant of the court of appeals's decision. As a consequence, applicant did not become aware of the court of appeals's decision until after the time for filing a petition for discretionary review had expired.

In a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus, filed with the trial court on April 13, 2004, applicant contended that he discovered the court of appeals's opinion after his own inquiry, that he was deprived of his right to file a PDR, and that, had one been filed, there was a significant chance his conviction would have been reversed. Applicant did not explain in his application why he believed a PDR would have had merit.

We filed and set this case to determine whether Hernandez v. State, (3) applying the prejudice prong of Strickland (4) to the punishment phase of noncapital cases, (5) had any impact on the rule announced in Wilson. Briefing was requested and applicant was appointed counsel for that purpose. Habeas counsel argued that a showing of prejudice was not required and, in the alternative, that the Batson claim had merit. In its brief, the State claimed that a showing of prejudice was required and that applicant failed to show prejudice because all of his claims on appeal were without merit.

II. ANALYSIS

Hernandez suggests that a prejudice component is always part of an ineffective assistance claim because the government is not responsible for deficient attorney performance and should not be held accountable absent some real harm. (6) But we must also address the present case in light of another, much more recent decision, Johnson v. State. (7) Johnson likewise held that all attorney errors should be viewed through the prism of the Strickland framework, except in conflict of interest cases and where the defendant is denied the right to counsel altogether. (8)

But Johnson recognized that Supreme Court precedent treats certain attorney errors a little differently under Strickland's prejudice prong than is ordinarily the case. (9) For attorney errors that involve a deprivation amounting to a structural defect, the prejudice inquiry is more limited. (10) These errors are rare, but include deficient conduct that results in the deprivation of an entire judicial proceeding, such as an appeal. (11) When a defendant's right to an entire judicial proceeding has been denied, the defendant is "required to show a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, a particular proceeding would have occurred, but he [is] not required to show that the proceeding would have resulted in a favorable outcome." (12) Or put another way, to meet the limited showing of prejudice in this context, "counsel's deficient performance must actually cause the forfeiture of the proceeding in question." (13) As part of showing that the counsel's conduct actually caused the forfeiture of the proceeding, the defendant must demonstrate that he would have availed himself of the proceeding in question. (14)

Although there is no right to discretionary review, an appellant ordinarily has a right to file a PDR in an attempt to persuade us to exercise our discretion. Losing the right to file a PDR constitutes the deprivation of that entire proceeding.

The question then becomes whether counsel's conduct caused the deprivation. In the PDR context, satisfying that showing entails: (1) demonstrating that the appellant was entitled to be in the appellate process, and (2) absent counsel's conduct, the appellant would have timely filed a PDR. When the appellant has no right to appeal, he can hardly be in position to complain about the denial of a PDR. In that circumstance, there should have been no occasion to file a PDR because appeal itself was unauthorized. So, where appeal is barred by Article 42.12, §5(b), (15) Rule 25.2(a)(2), (16) Manuel v. State, (17) or some similar provision or doctrine, or where the defendant waived appeal, the attorney's failure to comply with Wilson does not cause the defendant to be deprived of consideration of his PDR. Likewise, when an appellant would not have filed a PDR anyway, even if he had been notified in compliance with Wilson, then the attorney's action cannot be said to have caused the deprivation.

Applicant's case involved a prosecution on the primary offense, in a single proceeding, that resulted in conviction after a plea of not guilty. No statute, rule, or caselaw doctrine appears to prohibit appeal, no waiver of appeal is apparent, and the court of appeals addressed applicant's appeal on the merits. Consequently, we conclude that applicant was entitled to be in the appellate process. With regard to whether applicant would have filed a PDR, he filed his application less than a year after the court of appeals's opinion became final, he has alleged that he was deprived of the right to file a PDR and that he believes a PDR would have had a significant chance of success, and of course, he is currently asking for an out-of-time PDR. And there is no controverting evidence suggesting that he would not have filed a PDR. Under the circumstances present here, applicant's allegations are sufficient to prove that he would have filed a PDR if he had been properly informed in accordance with Wilson's dictates.

Applicant is granted leave to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review. Should applicant desire to seek discretionary review, he must take affirmative steps to see that his petition is filed in the Court of Appeals within thirty days after the issuance of the mandate of this Court in this cause.

Keller, Presiding Judge

Date delivered: November 23, 2005

Publish

1. 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

3. 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

4. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

5. Hernandez, supra.

6. 988 S.W.2d at 772.

7. 169 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

8. Id. at 231-232.

9. Id.

10. Id. at 231.

11. Id.

12. Id.

13. Id. at 232 (quoting from Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000); internal quotations omitted, brackets omitted from inserted material).

14. Id.

15. Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 42.12, §5(b)(deferred adjudication defendant cannot appeal trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt).

16. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(plea bargaining defendant who gets benefit of the bargain can appeal only those matters raised by written motion, filed, and ruled upon before trial or where trial court gives permission to appeal).

17. 994 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)(defendant cannot attack original plea in appeal from revocation of deferred or regular probation).

republic of texas: According to the Sentence Ramsey is to be Confined in Texas

2007-06-24T03:36:00.000-07:00

republic of texas: According to the Sentence Ramsey is to be Confined in Texas

Former Raza Unida gubernatorial candidate Ramsey Muñiz has been transferred from a federal corrections institute in Three Rivers six months after arriving at the facility.

Muñiz, who ran for governor of Texas in 1974 and 1975 under the Raza Unida Party, was transferred from Three Rivers on Tuesday.

Mike Truman, spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, said Muñiz is being housed in the Federal Transfer Facility in Oklahoma City until he can be transferred to another facility.

Truman said he could not release where Muñiz would be transferred or when, citing security concerns. He also said he did not know why Muñiz was transferred.

Muñiz, 64, is serving a life sentence for three felony drug convictions.

The Three Rivers Federal Correctional Institute, 77 miles northwest of Corpus Christi, has been the closest the former Miller High School football star and local defense attorney has been to home since his 1994 conviction.

Under the banner of Raza Unida, a political party shaped and led by Hispanic activists seeking a political voice, Muñiz earned support from 6 percent the state's registered voters.

Muñiz's wife, Irma Muñiz, said she was surprised to learn of the transfer especially because senators, congressmen and civic groups have written letters to the Federal Bureau of Prisons on her husband's behalf.

Irma Muñiz said her husband had hoped to be housed at the Three Rivers facility because of its proximity to his family in South Texas.

Since he was transferred there in December from an institute in Colorado, Irma Muñiz has made frequent trips to visit her husband.

She likened Muñiz's transfer out of Three Rivers to the treatment of Hispanic Civil Rights figure Felix Longoria.

Longoria, a U.S. Army private killed on-duty in the Philippines in 1945, was refused a proper funeral in his hometown of Three Rivers because the only funeral home in town didn't allow Hispanics to use its funeral chapel.

Civil Rights hero Dr. Hector P. Garcia interceded and U.S. Sen. Lyndon Johnson arranged for Longoria to be buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

Joe Ortiz, League of United Latin American Citizens district director and national and state civil rights director of the American GI Forum, helped organize letter-writing campaigns when Muñiz was in Colorado asking for his transfer to Texas.

Ortiz didn't know about the transfer out of Three Rivers but said both LULAC and the American GI Forum will work toward getting Muñiz returned to Texas.

"We are going to petition our legislators to see if they can do anything to bring him back," Ortiz said.

Contact Adriana Garza at 886-3618 or garzaa@caller.com

Posted by geomatica on June 21, 2007 at 9:47 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I am certain that Ramsey Muniz was falsely imprisoned, but no matter what you believe, he was and is a model prisoner, and it is a complete waste of taxpayer money to be moving him all over, when it makes the most sense for him to be here near his family. He didn't kill anybody, and his treatment has been nothing but inhumane. Something has to be done about the inequities in our prison system. His punishment certainly does not fit his supposed crime. When is his mistreatment and that of his family going to end?

Posted by colorderosa on June 22, 2007 at 9:13 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Only in America does a convicted murderer, chlld rapist, or other harden criminal walk free, while a supposed drug dealer gets life in prison.
colorderosa

Posted by sosiouxme13 on June 22, 2007 at 8:47 p.m. (Suggest removal)

In my opinion, someone convicted of dealing drugs, can be likened to a murderer...

Posted by dannoynted1 on June 23, 2007 at 5:25 a.m. (Suggest removal)

This is retaliation for the "scared status quo". They are afraid if he is in Texas he just might get out.

Only in Texas can this happen.

Eureka~ perhaps Jurisdiction resides in Oklahoma?

or is it Louisiana, where i hear Hayden Head is sending our Federally convicted non white americans as of late?.

Is that legal?
Why would you send a texan to another state unless you want to keep them from their family.

Posted by gmikedear1954 on June 23, 2007 at 3:44 p.m. (Suggest removal)

As a career Federal Agent living in Detroit, Michigan, I find it silly to deny this man the opportunity of being close to his family. As one person stated earlier that far worse criminals are given the option to be close to their family. Also, The whole war on drugs is nothing more than a farce to make contractors rich.

Posted by chuco11 on June 23, 2007 at 8:54 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Ram, you were the impetus for the movement that slowly is gaining speed. Maybe not in our lifetimes but down the road there will be Spanish spoken along with English in the schools, businesses and professional sports, to name a few, all across America not just Texas. "The Man" sees this and doesn't like it! But he can't stop the ineviteable. What was that old adage...."GOD grant me the serenity....... Irma, you are a model of a loving wife. All men should be this fortunate!

Common Law Governs~

2007-06-23T03:01:00.000-07:00

Art. 1.05. [3] [4] RIGHTS OF ACCUSED. In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury. He shall have the right to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. He
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. He shall
have the right of being heard by himself, or counsel, or both;
shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, and shall have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. No person
shall be held to answer for a felony unless on indictment of a grand
jury.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.051. RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL. (a) A
defendant in a criminal matter is entitled to be represented by
counsel in an adversarial judicial proceeding. The right to be
represented by counsel includes the right to consult in private
with counsel sufficiently in advance of a proceeding to allow
adequate preparation for the proceeding.
(b) For the purposes of this article and Articles 26.04 and
26.05 of this code, "indigent" means a person who is not financially
able to employ counsel.
(c) An indigent defendant is entitled to have an attorney
appointed to represent him in any adversary judicial proceeding
that may result in punishment by confinement and in any other
criminal proceeding if the court concludes that the interests of
justice require representation. Except as otherwise provided by
this subsection, if an indigent defendant is entitled to and
requests appointed counsel and if adversarial judicial proceedings
have been initiated against the defendant, a court or the courts'
designee authorized under Article 26.04 to appoint counsel for
indigent defendants in the county shall appoint counsel as soon as
possible, but not later than the end of the third working day after
the date on which the court or the courts' designee receives the
defendant's request for appointment of counsel. In a county with a
population of 250,000 or more, the court or the courts' designee
shall appoint counsel as required by this subsection as soon as
possible, but not later than the end of the first working day after
the date on which the court or the courts' designee receives the
defendant's request for appointment of counsel.
(d) An eligible indigent defendant is entitled to have the
trial court appoint an attorney to represent him in the following
appellate and postconviction habeas corpus matters:
(1) an appeal to a court of appeals;
(2) an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals if the appeal
is made directly from the trial court or if a petition for
discretionary review has been granted;
(3) a habeas corpus proceeding if the court concludes that
the interests of justice require representation; and
(4) any other appellate proceeding if the court concludes
that the interests of justice require representation.
(e) An appointed counsel is entitled to 10 days to prepare
for a proceeding but may waive the preparation time with the consent
of the defendant in writing or on the record in open court. If a
nonindigent defendant or an indigent defendant who has refused
appointed counsel in order to retain private counsel appears
without counsel at a proceeding after having been given a
reasonable opportunity to retain counsel, the court, on 10 days'
notice to the defendant of a dispositive setting, may proceed with
the matter without securing a written waiver or appointing counsel.
(f) A defendant may voluntarily and intelligently waive in
writing the right to counsel.
(g) If a defendant wishes to waive his right to counsel, the
court shall advise him of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation. If the court determines that the waiver is
voluntarily and intelligently made, the court shall provide the
defendant with a statement substantially in the following form,
which, if signed by the defendant, shall be filed with and become
part of the record of the proceedings:

"I have been advised this ______ day of __________,
19___, by the (name of court) Court of my right to
representation by counsel in the trial of the charge
pending against me. I have been further advised that
if I am unable to afford counsel, one will be appointed
for me free of charge. Understanding my right to have
counsel appointed for me free of charge if I am not
financially able to employ counsel, I wish to waive
that right and request the court to proceed with my
case without an attorney being appointed for me. I
hereby waive my right to counsel. (signature of the
defendant)"
(h) A defendant may withdraw a waiver of the right to
counsel at any time but is not entitled to repeat a proceeding
previously held or waived solely on the grounds of the subsequent
appointment or retention of counsel. If the defendant withdraws a
waiver, the trial court, in its discretion, may provide the
appointed counsel 10 days to prepare.
(i) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, if an
indigent defendant is entitled to and requests appointed counsel
and if adversarial judicial proceedings have not been initiated
against the defendant, a court or the courts' designee authorized
under Article 26.04 to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in
the county shall appoint counsel immediately following the
expiration of three working days after the date on which the court
or the courts' designee receives the defendant's request for
appointment of counsel. If adversarial judicial proceedings are
initiated against the defendant before the expiration of the three
working days, the court or the courts' designee shall appoint
counsel as provided by Subsection (c). In a county with a
population of 250,000 or more, the court or the courts' designee
shall appoint counsel as required by this subsection immediately
following the expiration of one working day after the date on which
the court or the courts' designee receives the defendant's request
for appointment of counsel. If adversarial judicial proceedings
are initiated against the defendant before the expiration of the
one working day, the court or the courts' designee shall appoint
counsel as provided by Subsection (c).
(j) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if
an indigent defendant is released from custody prior to the
appointment of counsel under this section, appointment of counsel
is not required until the defendant's first court appearance or
when adversarial judicial proceedings are initiated, whichever
comes first.
(k) A court or the courts' designee may without unnecessary
delay appoint new counsel to represent an indigent defendant for
whom counsel is appointed under Subsection (c) or (i) if:
(1) the defendant is subsequently charged in the case
with an offense different from the offense with which the defendant
was initially charged; and
(2) good cause to appoint new counsel is stated on the
record as required by Article 26.04(j)(2).

Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 979, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987.
Amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 906, Sec. 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2002.

Art. 1.052. SIGNED PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANT. (a) A pleading,
motion, and other paper filed for or on behalf of a defendant
represented by an attorney must be signed by at least one attorney
of record in the attorney's name and state the attorney's address.
A defendant who is not represented by an attorney must sign any
pleading, motion, or other paper filed for or on the defendant's
behalf and state the defendant's address.
(b) The signature of an attorney or a defendant constitutes
a certificate by the attorney or defendant that the person has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper and that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry that the instrument is not groundless and
brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for harassment,
unnecessary delay, or other improper purpose.
(c) If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, the
court shall strike it unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the attorney or defendant.
(d) An attorney or defendant who files a fictitious pleading
in a cause for an improper purpose described by Subsection (b) or
who makes a statement in a pleading that the attorney or defendant
knows to be groundless and false to obtain a delay of the trial of
the cause or for the purpose of harassment shall be held guilty of
contempt.
(e) If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this article, the court, on motion or on its own
initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties to the prosecution or to the general fund of the county in
which the pleading, motion, or other paper was filed the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(f) A court shall presume that a pleading, motion, or other
paper is filed in good faith. Sanctions under this article may not
be imposed except for good cause stated in the sanction order.
(g) A plea of "not guilty" or "no contest" or "nolo
contendere" does not constitute a violation of this article. An
allegation that an event took place or occurred on or about a
particular date does not constitute a violation of this article.
(h) In this article, "groundless" means without basis in law
or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Added by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 189, Sec. 11, eff. May 21, 1997.

Art. 1.06. [4] [5] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. The people shall
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all
unreasonable seizures or searches. No warrant to search any place
or to seize any person or thing shall issue without describing them
as near as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.07. [5] [6] RIGHT TO BAIL. All prisoners shall be
bailable unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident.
This provision shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after
indictment found upon examination of the evidence, in such manner
as may be prescribed by law.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.08. [6] [7] HABEAS CORPUS. The writ of habeas corpus
is a writ of right and shall never be suspended.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.09. [7] [8] CRUELTY FORBIDDEN. Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.10. [8] [9] JEOPARDY. No person for the same offense
shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty; nor shall a
person be again put upon trial for the same offense, after a verdict
of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.11. [9] [20] [21] ACQUITTAL A BAR. An acquittal of
the defendant exempts him from a second trial or a second
prosecution for the same offense, however irregular the proceedings
may have been; but if the defendant shall have been acquitted upon
trial in a court having no jurisdiction of the offense, he may be
prosecuted again in a court having jurisdiction.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.12. [10] [10] RIGHT TO JURY. The right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.13. [10A] WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY. (a) The defendant
in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital
felony case in which the State notifies the court and the defendant
that it will seek the death penalty shall have the right, upon
entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned,
however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defendant in
writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court,
and the attorney representing the State. The consent and approval
by the court shall be entered of record on the minutes of the court,
and the consent and approval of the attorney representing the State
shall be in writing, signed by him, and filed in the papers of the
cause before the defendant enters his plea.
(b) In a capital felony case in which the attorney
representing the State notifies the court and the defendant that it
will not seek the death penalty, the defendant may waive the right
to trial by jury but only if the attorney representing the State, in
writing and in open court, consents to the waiver.
(c) A defendant may agree to waive a jury trial regardless
of whether the defendant is represented by an attorney at the time
of making the waiver, but before a defendant charged with a felony
who has no attorney can agree to waive the jury, the court must
appoint an attorney to represent him.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.
Amended by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 652, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1,
1991; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 285, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.

Art. 1.14. [11] [22] [23] WAIVER OF RIGHTS. (a) The
defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any
rights secured him by law except that a defendant in a capital
felony case may waive the right of trial by jury only in the manner
permitted by Article 1.13(b) of this code.
(b) If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or
irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information
before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he
waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or
irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any
other postconviction proceeding. Nothing in this article prohibits
a trial court from requiring that an objection to an indictment or
information be made at an earlier time in compliance with Article
28.01 of this code.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.
Amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1733, ch. 659, Sec. 1, eff. Aug.
28, 1967; Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1127, ch. 426, art. 3, Sec. 5,
eff. June 14, 1973; Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 577, Sec. 1, eff. Dec.
1, 1985; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 652, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1991.

Art. 1.141. WAIVER OF INDICTMENT FOR NONCAPITAL FELONY. A
person represented by legal counsel may in open court or by written
instrument voluntarily waive the right to be accused by indictment
of any offense other than a capital felony. On waiver as provided
in this article, the accused shall be charged by information.

Added by Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p. 1148, ch. 260, Sec. 1, eff. May 19,
1971.

Art. 1.15. [12] [21] [22] JURY IN FELONY. No person can be
convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly
rendered and recorded, unless the defendant, upon entering a plea,
has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in
writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided,
however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce
evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said
evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its
judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon
his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The
evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in
writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and
cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an
oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the
introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of
witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the
judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by
the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of the
cause.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.
Amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1733, ch. 659, Sec. 2, eff. Aug.
28, 1967; Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p. 3028, ch. 996, Sec. 1, eff. June
15, 1971; Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1127, ch. 426, art. 3, Sec. 5,
eff. June 14, 1973; Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 652, Sec. 3, eff.
Sept. 1, 1991.

Art. 1.16. [13] [11] LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND PRESS. Every
person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinion on
any subject, being liable for the abuse of that privilege; and no
law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the
press. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating
the conduct of officers or men in public capacity, or when the
matter published is proper for public information, the truth
thereof may be given in evidence. In all indictments for libels,
the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.17. [14] [12] RELIGIOUS BELIEF. No person shall be
disqualified to give evidence in any court of this State on account
of his religious opinions, or for the want of any religious belief;
but all oaths or affirmations shall be administered in the mode most
binding upon the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains
and penalties of perjury.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.18. [15] [13] OUTLAWRY AND TRANSPORTATION. No
citizen shall be outlawed, nor shall any person be transported out
of the State for any offense committed within the same.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.19. [16] [14] CORRUPTION OF BLOOD, ETC. No
conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.20. [17] [15] CONVICTION OF TREASON. No person shall
be convicted of treason except on the testimony of two witnesses to
the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.21. [18] [16] PRIVILEGE OF LEGISLATORS. Senators and
Representatives shall, except in cases of treason, felony or breach
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the
Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, allowing
one day for every twenty miles such member may reside from the place
at which the Legislature is convened.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.23. [20] [19] DIGNITY OF STATE. All justices of the
Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, justices of
the Courts of Appeals and judges of the District Courts, shall, by
virtue of their offices, be conservators of the peace throughout
the State. The style of all writs and process shall be "The State of
Texas". All prosecutions shall be carried on "in the name and by
authority of The State of Texas", and conclude, "against the peace
and dignity of the State".

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.
Amended by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 801, ch. 291, Sec. 97, eff.
Sept. 1, 1981.

Art. 1.24. [21] [23] [24] PUBLIC TRIAL. The proceedings and
trials in all courts shall be public.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.25. [22] [24] [25] CONFRONTED BY WITNESSES. The
defendant, upon a trial, shall be confronted with the witnesses,
except in certain cases provided for in this Code where depositions
have been taken.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.26. [23] [25] [26] CONSTRUCTION OF THIS CODE. The
provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed, so as to
attain the objects intended by the Legislature: The prevention,
suppression and punishment of crime.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966.

Art. 1.27. [24] [26] [27] COMMON LAW GOVERNS. If this Code
fails to provide a rule of procedure in any particular state of case
which may arise, the rules of the common law shall be applied and
govern.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722, eff. Jan. 1, 1966

I. DID THE 13TH COURT OF APPEALS ERR: The Texas Fair Defense Act Here is a Perfect Chance to Show Your Teeth

2007-06-22T04:39:00.000-07:00

I. DID THE 13TH COURT OF APPEALS ERR: The Texas Fair Defense Act Here is a Perfect Chance to Show Your Teeth

1. Appellant demands this appeal be abated and this court direct Appellant’s Attorney to represent her.

2. Appellant request legal representation as her request to oral argument is forbidden without it.

3. Appellant apologizes for any error committed as a Pro Se Defendant (Layperson) and for any reversible error committed; to be informed and given the opportunity to correct the error. Appellant at this late hour realizes she never signed the PDR she submitted and moves to correct at the Court’s discretion.

4. Appellant has had ineffective assistance of council. Jill Williams still represents appellant because she has never ask the courts permission in writing or in open court to withdraw. (List crucial periods without representation like when the state originally confessed) (error during the period immediately following submission to the clerk of the 13^th COA until the Court began to consider it.) (See Letter from Attorney)

5. Appellant request this court order a TWC investigation into this “comedy of errors”, “confession of errors” and “peculiar circumstances”. In the Alternative it is requested that all TWC subject matter be forwarded to the appropriate entities, The Governor of Texas, the Attorney General of the State of Texas and the Texas Workforce Executive Staff.

6. Appellant request this court order both administrative and criminal hearings to assist fact finders in the imminent TWC investigation. See attached TWC letter dated June 20, 2007.

7. Appellant invites TWC to submit a friend of the court letter.

8. Appellant request this court engage the TWC and conduct a hearing on this matter before ruling on the motion for rehearing

9. The 13^th Court of Appeals erred by excluding statements made on the (MFNT) record. The State did file a reply brief. This demonstrates that the court has not made its decision based on a whole record.

10. The Failure of the State to file a reply brief is treated as a confession of error per Siverand v. State ¹. As grounds for this cause Appellant respectfully request this Court take Judicial notice based on intervening Supreme Court precedent per Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000) ² and grant this petition for discretionary review, vacate the judgment and remand the case for further consideration in light of developments during the pendency of this appeal. Specifically, it is requested this Court require such further proceedings (remand to trial court for the State to correct the error and file its reply) to be had as may be just under the circumstances.

11. The 13^th COA erred in it’s ruling, “any opposing arguments are limited to those advanced by the State in the trial court”.

12. Appellant relies on the complete appellate record.

13. The 13^th Court of Appeals made arguments on behalf of the state by technically censoring actual confessions of error in the Hearing on the Motion For New Trial. The confessions by the state are muted under the confession of error per Siverand Limiting the appellate record on behalf of the state to the trial court setting. Limiting the appellate record on behalf of the state to the trial court setting, the state’s side of the record that has vanished, when appellant relied on crucial testimony in the MFNT Hearing.

14. The 6th Amendment not a waivable right. It stands independent of ineffective assistance of counsel? The State needs to legitimize how State employee can be under subpoena as a witness for the State’s Adversary in a criminal proceeding and the state cannot compel her to appear. Then not file a reply brief in effect quashing the first opinion and censoring the confessions of error committed by the State during the Motion For New Trial.

15. The Failure of the State to file a reply brief is treated as a confession of error ¹; in this case the States Confession of Error is a "fundamental error" requiring correction. Although this court “may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review” it may also remand for further consideration in light of the confession of error ³. From the beginning this case has presented a comedy of errors and in particular some very peculiar circumstances. The States failure to file a reply brief deprives the appellant of crucial statements made by the State ² (by limiting any opposing arguments to those advanced by the State in the trial court. Id). It is this appellant’s belief the error is a tactical approach to disenfranchise Appellant of her right to fully supplement the record in her motion for new trial. Benefit from committing an error or committing an error so as to benefit from. Sounds like a Texas criminal style legislation to me

16. The decision of the Appellate court conflicts with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(h) and 38.2(a)(1) ⁴ and Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ⁵. The Appellate Court unequivocally has advanced arguments on behalf of the state. Not only have arguments been made on behalf of the state there are arguments made by the Appellate Court that are completely inaccurate: The 13th COA makes the statement “The record reflects that counsel exercised his ten peremptory strikes and, therefore, did not have an available strike for Ruff”. (Vol. 2 RR p,3 @3-6) (Vol. 1RR p.114). Is this court reading the same court record that this Appellant possesses? Appellant challenges the record furnished to the Appellant court as the record clearly reflects in direct contradiction of the 13^th Court of Appeals record. There were available strikes, Appellant’s Counsel exercised ZERO peremptory strikes. This shows there could be other mistakes or misreadings. Justice in this case requires that the Appellate Court did not understand the facts of the case well enough to properly and justiciably make a decision. The Confession of error by the State and blatant errors committed while reviewing the record as a whole in the appellate court. There is too much error and all of it is harmful. Appellant waives no error known and unknown.

17. The decision of the Appellate court contradicts itself with respect to its decision in Siverand.

18. Limiting the states record advances arguments on behalf of the state

19. The 13^th Court of Appeals relies on an incomplete record and has quoted the record inaccurately. This means either the record is either incomplete, inaccurate or the Independent Jurist did not take their duty seriously. The timing is highly suspicious being that two of the three Jurists were involved in campaigning, political maneuvering, schmoozing and networking and concentrating on their JOB.

20. Procedural Posture is faulty in light of confession of errors once the state confesses errors the errors need to be corrected.

21. The decision of the Appellate court contradicts itself with respect to Saldano v. Texas, 530 U.S. 1212 (2000) ². In light of the confession of error the case should be “remanded for further consideration in light of the confession of error”.

22. The verdict in said cause is contrary to the law and the evidence and there is newly discovered evidence touching the issues involved in said cause. Below is the controlling administrative law. This makes the entry Legal and TRUE. This is a WIA, TWC And Texas Department of Human Services directive per Standard Operating Procedure.

TEXAS WORKFORCE APPEALS POLICY AND PRECEDENT MANUAL

TOTAL AND PARTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT

_{TPU 105.00

TPU 105.00 CONTRACT OBLIGATION.}_{INCLUDES CASES IN WHICH THE CLAIMANT'S CONTRACTS OR AGREEMENTS HAVE AN EFFECT ON DETERMINING HIS UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS.

Appeal No. 82-4799-10-0782. Substitute teachers may have reasonable assurance of continued employment within the meaning of
Section 3(f) (now codified as}_{Section 207.041}_{) of the Act. In determining}_{whether such}_{reasonable assurance}_{exists with regard to}_{substitute teachers, the following criteria should be utilized: The school district must furnish to the Commission written statements which provide facts that the substitute teacher has been asked to continue in the same capacity for the following academic year. Simply placing the substitute teacher on a list for the following year does not establish reasonable assurance. It must be shown that both parties expect the relationship to resume at the beginning of the following year. The assurance must also be based on past experience with regard to the number of substitutes needed in the past.}

23. The trial of the above cause was not had before, nor was the verdict therein rendered by "an impartial jury."

24. Appellant’s right to the Compulsory Process was and continues to be thwarted. Material Witness Mary Cano never appeared to any of the proceedings in which Defendant’s / Appellant’s Counsel subpoenaed her. A subpoena was issued for Mary Cano directing her to appear before the same court proceeding (MFNT) in which the State claims it can get her there if she is needed. The State admits knowledge of Mary Cano’s whereabouts and goes on to boast of her being easy to find; yet whether willfully or inadvertently LeeAnn Haley’s 6^th Amendment right to Compulsory Process was violated.

¹_. ”_{When confronted with this situation, we treat the State's failure to file a brief as a confession of error. Siverand v. State, 89 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)."}

²_{Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded}

_{No. 99–8119. Saldano v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari}

_{granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the confession of error}

1. ”When confronted with this situation, we treat the State's failure to file a brief as a confession of error. Siverand v. State, 89 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.)."
2 Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 99–8119. Saldano v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of the confession of error

3 Pursuant to Siverand, we will make an independent examination of the merits of appellant's points of error and any opposing arguments are limited to those advanced by the State in the trial court. Id.
4 The rules of appellate procedure require the parties to advance their own arguments. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h) and 38.2(a)(1).
5 Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) Finally, decisional authority prevents us from advancing arguments on behalf of either party.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the court will:

1. Abate the Appeal, order a hearing to conduct a TWC administrative investigation and hold a hearing to conduct a Criminal Investigation and appoint counsel.

2. Remand this case for a new trial, or

3. Grant Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.

4. Grant Appellants Motion for Rehearing, vacate the 13th COA opinion and remand for New trial and court appointed counsel.

5. Grant Appellants Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Rehearing before ruling.

Respectfully submitted,

Let's start installing that new infrastructure!

2007-06-19T03:53:00.000-07:00

Let us look at this as a team and....

we are the coaches, each of us particular to our own discipline. Everybody wants to handle the ball but not everybody can make touchdowns. So we grade our athletes as they demonstrate their skills in spring training. Some are more talented than others. Decisions are made that can hurt feelings but they are best for the team. There is no I in team. Quarterbacks, there can be only one starter, running backs are alternated as are receivers. Defensive backs and linebackers get to hit hard, intercept passes and sack the quarterback. Linemen enjoy blowing holes wide open, while trains drive through them and defensive linemen are just the meanest animals on the team; they enjoy defeating two and three men at one time while their team mates are freed to tackle the runner.

So as coaches we need to recognize the attributes and put them where they will be the most successful as a team player.

In doing this we must challenge the athletes to compete for the position they want most and a couple of other positions they can play.

A long time ago the top vote getter was the president and the second most vote getter the vice president. In a spring training we as coaches should encourage our athletes, expect their responsiveness and determine their "coachability". Find a place for all who throw their hat in as per the vote they earn.

Now, if that ain't Utopia then, "there ain't a cow in Texas".

Let's start installing that new infrastructure!